We consider a repeated 2-person 0-sum game with incomplete information about the pay-off matrix. Player I (maximizer) knows the real pay-off matrix but he is uncertain about the beliefs of his opponent. We show that in this case the Aumann-Maschler results on incomplete information on one side no longer hold. In particular such a game will not have a value in general, in spite of the fact that one player is fully informed about the state of nature. Although formally such games turn out to be equivalent to games of incomplete information on two sides, we think that they merit special attention for at least two reasons:
Introduction. In the literature on 2-person 0-sum repeated games of incomplete information ([1],[2],[3]
) a distinction is made between games with incomplete information on one side in which one of the players is fully informed about the pay-off matrix and games with incomplete information on two sides in which both players are uncertain about the real pay-off matrix. In this note we consider what looks at first sight to be intermediate case (suggesting the name "incomplete information on 1 I sides"): one player is fully informed about the true state of nature but he is uncertain about the beliefs of his opponent about the state of nature. Although formally such games turn out to be equivalent to games of incomplete information on two sides, we think that they merit special attention for at least two reasons:
(1) They underline the distinction between state of nature, which is in this case the true pay-off matrix, and state of the world, which is the state of nature and the state of all beliefs and mutual beliefs concerning the state of nature (see [4] ). Here we have a situation in which one player has complete information about the state of nature (namely the pay-offs) but incomplete information about the state of the world, since he has incomplete information about the beliefs of the other player. As we shall see, these games will not have a value in general and hence behave mathematically as games of incomplete information on two sides. The conclusion to remember is therefore: when speaking about a game of incomplete information in which a certain player has a complete information, it has to be clear that he has a complete information about the state of the world (and not only on the state of nature) and only then may we apply the various results on incomplete information on one side.
In reference to [4], the structure of hierarchy of beliefs, the case we will be considering is of the simplest generic type: the hierarchy of beliefs consists of one level after which all becomes a common knowledge.
(2) The games considered here are mathematically equivalent to games of incomplete information on two sides of what is called the dependent case (see [2] ), that is the beliefs of each player on the types of the other player depend on his own type. This shows that the dependent case is not only conceivable but seems to be rather the typical case: whenever the states of the world or the "types" in question contain also the beliefs, as is typically the situation, the dependent case seems inavoidable. Step 00. Chance chooses t E (r,s} with Prob(t = r) = X and this choice is told to Player II only.
Step 0. Chance chooses C E (A, B } with Prob(C = A) = t and this choice is told to Player I only.
Step 1. Player I (resp. Player II) selects some move i EG I (resp. j EG J) and this choice is announced to both players. For m = 1, ... , n:
Step m. Both players knowing in addition to their private information (from Steps 00 and 0) the previous history, i.e. (il, j ... , im,-, jm -), select some move and this pair (im, j,) is announced to both players. G(AX,r,s) is the n-repeated game with pay-off for Player I (the maximizer) given by: n -' C=,I and Go is the infinitely repeated game. All the previous description including this sentence is common knowledge.
The game can be represented as follows: Obviously these games belong to the special class of games with lack of information on both sides, dependent case, as introduced in [2] .
In fact, using the notations there we have: Note that the min max is the value of the game where Player I is also informed of t.
Finally for the maxmin we get:
Cav Vexu(q) = sup { t Vexl,,( So we have: Cav1Vex1l -Vex11Cav, everywhere on the interior of the simplex.
3.3. In order to study v, we first compare v and u (recall that max min < v < minmax).
It is generally true for the solution v of (1) and (2) Th fact that Cav Vex # Vex Cav everywhere in the interior of the simplex now implies that there is a game G(X, r, 1) with: maxmin < v < min max.
